TVGuy wrote:Sec. 30.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:
(2) "Building" means any enclosed structure intended for use or occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament, or use.
Chapter 30 deals with BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS. All of the definitions in 30.01 pertain to the rules in that chapter. The rule we are dealing with, 46.03a4 which is contained in Chapter 40. And Chapter 40 has no definition of "building" among all of its specific definitions for that chapter. And Penal Code 1.07 global definitions contain no such definition.
So we still do not have a good definition for " building" specifically for Chapter 40.
Now, under the canons of statutory interpretation, without a legal definition the court would defer to the common meaning and usage of a word or term. And it's not uncommon in those situations that the court would, absent specific chapter or sectional definitions, turn to definitions used in other chapters and sections, especially when the interpretation does no violence to reasonable meaning.
The 30.05 use of "reasonably likely to come to the attention of...." phrase to define what "conspicuous" means in 30.06 and 30.07 is a good example of where a court might turn to define "conspicuous".
So, let's assume that the "building" spoken of in the 46.03 definition of "premises" does mean "... any enclosed structure intended for use or occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament, or use..." then one could conclude that sitting in the stands at a racetrack is permissible since they are not "enclosed intended for [yada, yada, yada]...".
And thus we have the answer to the OP.
Or do we.
tex