More info on the scope of 30.06 signage placement

[ScottDLS]

You have no idea what the statute is intended to do other than the expressed words used to create the statute. It doesn't matter what the legislature intended to do. What we live by are the words in the statute.

We live by the plain words of the statute, as they are interpreted to apply by the judiciary, and/or as suggested by the AG. The judiciary and the AG go to legislative intent when they need to interpret statutory language that leaves doubt or suggests unjust or unintended results. I presented numerous ridiculous examples that you say are supported by the plain language of the statute, if interpreted the way you state the plain language should be. So I asked to to provide examples of where it has ever been interpreted that way in Texas or other jurisdictions with very similar plain language in their statutes. You did not.

It would be a Class B if they violated those policies and they were associated with the owner's consent to entry. And the owner pressed charges. There is no reading of the statute that suggests otherwise...only your opinion of the way things should be, or ought to be, or what makes sense; all of which are irrelevant to what the statute actually states.


Again that's how you read the statute, but given the non-sensical results in my example, I believe you are incorrect. The issue goes to the ability of a property owner to compel certain conditions through criminal sanction regardless of how minimal or arbitrary those conditions are. That is what leads me to conclude that the statute was not intended for that and I don't believe the language supports it.

Listen to yourself.....30.05 allows owners to exclude entry only in a general sense but the ejection part of the rule can be specific and for any reason or applicable to a specific person. The rule doesn't state that and you are inflicting that interpretation on the rule.

Again, where has it been held or interpreted as such? I don't interpret it that way, you do, and so far there are no other relevant findings...I have noted where your interpretation leads to nonsense and (arguably) unjust conclusions, but you insist that it must be so because that's the way you read it.


The Morales opinion, while old, uses good analysis in the text. And he cites decades old cases as well as more current cases AND the library is filled with thousands of cases which rely on the Morales citations for their precedent. I have provided supporting evidence. Can you provide cases that refute those precedents.

Where does the DM-363 support your interpretation of the exclusion of persons from publicly open property, via written/posted conditions of entry, other than for concealed handguns? I read the opinion several times and the cases do not seem to address your interpretation...even arguably for concealed handguns (which is moot anyway).

You repeatedly state that your interpretations of criminal trespass apply to any and all written conditions of entry regardless of how arbitrary, in the absence of additional notice to depart, yet none of DM-363 or other cites support this....


Try federal case law which has more jurisdictional authority over our situation than those states. OH WAIT! Morales actually cites other states also! How about that!


This is a non-sequitur. I provide a couple of moderately specific references, and you tell me about federal case law (for what? Federal trespass law?). If there were similarly worded federal statutes that have precedent for this case, what are they? I haven't found any. The references in DM-363 are establishing the right to exclude without penalty on the party doing the excluding. They don't go to the criminalization of the conditions of entry that are being excluded under 30.05.

The Morales opinion, while old, uses good analysis in the text. And he cites decades old cases as well as more current cases AND the library is filled with thousands of cases which rely on the Morales citations for their precedent. I have provided supporting evidence. Can you provide cases that refute those precedents.

- I have read DM 363 several times and it doesn't address 30.05 enforceability to conditions of entry other than while carrying handguns. My argument based on the reading of Morales' discussion of the case law and legislative history, leads me to believe that he was looking for a mechanism to apply to CHL carrying handguns specifically because the legislators rejected creating a separate statute (until 1997). He was reaching for a way to make it illegal and believed he found it in 30.05, though it had NEVER been held to apply that way before, nor has it since. Some examples would be police officers carrying in a location where written rules specifically prohibit it, and the carrying of concealed rifle, or any other prohibited, but unseen conditions. There's no "case law" on this then, or since. There is only DM-363, which was mooted.

We disagree. You didn't take to heart the previous thread when Charles Cotton gave you his guidance and you essentially have reasserted all of the same arguments again.

any readers of the debate can draw their own conclusions


Charles disagreed with my characterization of Morales opinion as being related to the Legislative debates that went on during the discussion of the CHL law. I have little knowledge of those, but what is referenced in DM-363 doesn't seem to support your assertions about 30.05 trespass law applying to ALL written conditions of entry, except for CHL. It addresses prohibiting CHL. The statute was rendered moot by 30.06, and there have been no further cases, opinions, or decisions since that support your reading of the statute. Nor were there even any that supported DM-363 between 1995 and 1997.

[thetexan]

Where does the DM-363 support your interpretation of the exclusion of persons from publicly open property, via written/posted conditions of entry, other than for concealed handguns? I read the opinion several times and the cases do not seem to address your interpretation...even arguably for concealed handguns (which is moot anyway).

You repeatedly state that your interpretations of criminal trespass apply to any and all written conditions of entry regardless of how arbitrary, in the absence of additional notice to depart, yet none of DM-363 or other cites support this....

The point is that I am making no interpretations. I'm going out of my way not to add assumption and interpretation. The statute says what it says and we have no choice but to take it literally absent court interpretation. I don't say you can or can't do anything. What I say is the statute does not say one way or the other outside of its literal meaning. A owner may prevent entry of people with ball point pens simply because the statute doesn't prevent him from doing so.

We may disagree and argue but ain''t it fun!

And we learn alot in the process. It's low calorie and I don't have to leave my recliner.

tex

[ScottDLS]

Where does the DM-363 support your interpretation of the exclusion of persons from publicly open property, via written/posted conditions of entry, other than for concealed handguns? I read the opinion several times and the cases do not seem to address your interpretation...even arguably for concealed handguns (which is moot anyway).

You repeatedly state that your interpretations of criminal trespass apply to any and all written conditions of entry regardless of how arbitrary, in the absence of additional notice to depart, yet none of DM-363 or other cites support this....

The point is that I am making no interpretations. I'm going out of my way not to add assumption and interpretation. The statute says what it says and we have no choice but to take it literally absent court interpretation. I don't say you can or can't do anything. What I say is the statute does not say one way or the other outside of its literal meaning. A owner may prevent entry of people with ball point pens simply because the statute doesn't prevent him from doing so.

We may disagree and argue but ain''t it fun!

And we learn alot in the process. It's low calorie and I don't have to leave my recliner.

tex

I now see what you are saying. The literal meaning of 30.05 (in absence of relevant executive/judicial interpretation) is where we differ.

My reading is that the statute allows you to communicate a general prohibition on entry through a sign/written notice, or subsequently revoke consent for ANY reason.

Yours is that you may communicate ANY condition whatsoever in advance, as long as you make it clear that it is a condition of entry. And that violation of that condition is a crime.

Anyway good discussion...now about that Federal Gun Free Safe School Zones act...