Ft. Worth Zoo Update

[ScottDLS]

Fort Worth Zoo was also claiming to be an "educational institution".

They have certainly caused us to learn a lot about the law.

And I am still claiming to be King of Texas. As sovereign I am exempt from TXPC.

[AJSully421]

Delete all of 46.03 / .035 except for prisons, courtrooms, and secured areas of airports and all of this goes away.

Although, the zoo may claim to have a "Kangaroo Court" and still post signs. Liberalism is a mental disease.

[KLB]

Except that the property is OWNED by the city, so 30.06 still not valid.

This is moot as to this case given the outcome but not as to other leases of government property. The statute says that a state agency or political subdivision may not provide notices as to property owned or leased by the governmental entity.

So you've got a two-pronged test:

1. Is the notice being given by a state agency or political subdivision, and

2. Is the property subject to the notice owned or leased by the agency or subdivision.

Both prongs must be met. In the case of government-owned property leased to a private tenant, if the private tenant posts the notice, the notice is not being given by the state agency or political subdivision. Thus, 411.209 does not apply.

I am not personally offended by this result in the case of a genuine lease to a private tenant. But local governments often have pet private-sector entities to whom they routinely give grants and with whom they otherwise deal. It's not hard to imagine a city setting up a lease and leaseback arrangement for next to no money but that results in 30.06 and 30.07 signs being posted. I can almost guarantee you some city will try this.

[G.A. Heath]

Except that the property is OWNED by the city, so 30.06 still not valid.

This is moot as to this case given the outcome but not as to other leases of government property. The statute says that a state agency or political subdivision may not provide notices as to property owned or leased by the governmental entity.

So you've got a two-pronged test:

1. Is the notice being given by a state agency or political subdivision, and

2. Is the property subject to the notice owned or leased by the agency or subdivision.

Both prongs must be met. In the case of government-owned property leased to a private tenant, if the private tenant posts the notice, the notice is not being given by the state agency or political subdivision. Thus, 411.209 does not apply.

I am not personally offended by this result in the case of a genuine lease to a private tenant. But local governments often have pet private-sector entities to whom they routinely give grants and with whom they otherwise deal. It's not hard to imagine a city setting up a lease and leaseback arrangement for next to no money but that results in 30.06 and 30.07 signs being posted. I can almost guarantee you some city will try this.

RE #2, that is not really the case. Lets say I own property and I am prohibited by law from building a slaughter house on said property. I can not lease said property out to the Texas Slaughter House Owners Guild and knowingly allow them to build said slaughter house. I am building the slaughter house by extension of allowing it to be built on my property. The same goes for wrongfully excluding license holders from government owned property. A government agency or political sub-division that permits the posting of signage that wrongfully excludes license holders is guilty of committing the act because they knowingly permit it to happen. Once a government body is aware of a wrongful exclusion on their property they must act to correct it before the AG's office takes action.

[ScottDLS]

Except that the property is OWNED by the city, so 30.06 still not valid.

This is moot as to this case given the outcome but not as to other leases of government property. The statute says that a state agency or political subdivision may not provide notices as to property owned or leased by the governmental entity.

So you've got a two-pronged test:

1. Is the notice being given by a state agency or political subdivision, and

2. Is the property subject to the notice owned or leased by the agency or subdivision.

Both prongs must be met. In the case of government-owned property leased to a private tenant, if the private tenant posts the notice, the notice is not being given by the state agency or political subdivision. Thus, 411.209 does not apply.

I am not personally offended by this result in the case of a genuine lease to a private tenant. But local governments often have pet private-sector entities to whom they routinely give grants and with whom they otherwise deal. It's not hard to imagine a city setting up a lease and leaseback arrangement for next to no money but that results in 30.06 and 30.07 signs being posted. I can almost guarantee you some city will try this.

I am personally offended by this regardless of the status of the lessee. Your interpretation of 411.209 is not yet supported by any AG opinion or court and I find it very likely to go the other way. However, regardless of whether the FW Zoo gets fined for POSTING the signs, they are not enforceable. A quick way to settle that would be to open carry there. Alternatively you could conceal and carry secure in the knowledge that if discovered you would not be committing a crime.

[doncb]

After the Dallas Zoo / Amusement park was OK'd by the AG, you can bet that the Ft. Worth Zoo will now claim it too is an amusement park since they have a train. The AG will cave even though other requirements may not be met. It's "for the children" after all. The law needs (must) be tightened so that this kind of thing can't happen even if the AG falls for the bogus claims and has no spine. Unless it is wholly owned and run by a govt. entity, any kind of lease on city property will get a pass be it a museum, zoo or landfill. It MUST be if the city owns the land, that's IT. If the City owns the land, NO 30.06. End of discussion. And that includes periodic / temporary exhibits or shows. (unless they have a monorail or train of course ).

Come on AG, grow a spine and follow the law.

[Rex B]

I suspect our AG is trying to make nice with all parties while he works out that pesky felony indictment thing.
Maybe if that wasn't hanging over his head he would be more proactive in, you know, ACTUALLY ENFORCING THE LAW.

[Charles L. Cotton]

Except that the property is OWNED by the city, so 30.06 still not valid.

This is moot as to this case given the outcome but not as to other leases of government property. The statute says that a state agency or political subdivision may not provide notices as to property owned or leased by the governmental entity.

So you've got a two-pronged test:

1. Is the notice being given by a state agency or political subdivision, and

2. Is the property subject to the notice owned or leased by the agency or subdivision.

Both prongs must be met. In the case of government-owned property leased to a private tenant, if the private tenant posts the notice, the notice is not being given by the state agency or political subdivision. Thus, 411.209 does not apply.

I am not personally offended by this result in the case of a genuine lease to a private tenant. But local governments often have pet private-sector entities to whom they routinely give grants and with whom they otherwise deal. It's not hard to imagine a city setting up a lease and leaseback arrangement for next to no money but that results in 30.06 and 30.07 signs being posted. I can almost guarantee you some city will try this.

You are mistaken. There is a one-prong test; i.e. is the property owned or leased by a governmental entity. If the answer is yes, then 30.06 notice cannot be given by anyone without the governmental entity incurring liability under Tex. Gov't Code §411.209.

The property owner cannot pass by rent, lease or otherwise, greater rights than the property possesses. Since governmental entities cannot provide notice under §30.06, neither can the person or entity renting or leasing the property. If the governmental entity or agency does not prohibit a renter or lessor from giving notice under §30.06, and/or did not remove the sign (or counter oral notice), then such inaction constitutes a ratification or affirmation of the private person or entity's actions.

Chas.

[Papa_Tiger]

After the Dallas Zoo / Amusement park was OK'd by the AG, you can bet that the Ft. Worth Zoo will now claim it too is an amusement park since they have a train. The AG will cave even though other requirements may not be met. It's "for the children" after all. The law needs (must) be tightened so that this kind of thing can't happen even if the AG falls for the bogus claims and has no spine. Unless it is wholly owned and run by a govt. entity, any kind of lease on city property will get a pass be it a museum, zoo or landfill. It MUST be if the city owns the land, that's IT. If the City owns the land, NO 30.06. End of discussion. And that includes periodic / temporary exhibits or shows. (unless they have a monorail or train of course ).

Come on AG, grow a spine and follow the law.

The Ft. Worth Zoo doesn't meet the definition of an amusement park per Texas statue as it isn't 75 Acres. The AG is following the strictest interpretation of the law and not pursuing anything where mitigating circumstances could cast doubt on the outcome. He is playing a bit of a long game here, going after the easiest low hanging fruit to establish case law and then making sure that the definition is expanded to the fullest extent of the law in the future. Have patience.

Regarding the 30.06 on city property, there is a list of places that can be government owned AND posted. It is found in TPC 46.035 and an amusement park is one of the places that can be posted 30.06.

[KLB]

Charles Cotton says:

You are mistaken.

I drafted a lengthy reply to you based on my reading of 411.209. But in thinking through that reply, I realized I needed to refer to 30.06 and 30.07. When I did that, I saw your point. The Penal Code provisions are phrased differently from the Government Code. They don't require that the notice be given by the local government, only that the local government be the owner.

Since the Penal Code is what defines the elements of an offense, I expect (and certainly hope) it controls over the Government Code in such a situation.

I was more cynical about ambiguities in statutory provisions until I myself had the experience of writing a lengthy chapter of a municipal code. Countless hours went into it, but I still found problems working under it after it was adopted. In this case, though it's confusing, the difference can be explained by the different functions of the two provisions. The Penal Code provisions define offenses. The Government Code provision limits the right of state agencies and political subdivisions to post notices. Different purposes, different words.

So I've come around to your view, but I know some local governments read 411.209 as I did. We are likely to eventually find out what the courts think.

[BTP]

Is it even a properly worded sign? I do notice now after reading this thread that they like to use the term "amusement ride" on the lower one.

[rotor]

Is it even a properly worded sign? I do notice now after reading this thread that they like to use the term "amusement ride" on the lower one.

Not a properly worded sign.

[rtschl]

I do not believe the sign meets the legal requirement as they combined the wording of 30.06 and 30.07 into one notification on a single sign. The statute for both 30.06 and 30.07 states it must be "written language identical" and then states what that requirement is. It's not a problem if they put both notices on one sign, it's that the sign does not contain the "identical" language of either statute as required by the statute.

[Rex B]

Those people really think they are clever.

[KLB]

Is it even a properly worded sign?

The restriction for amusement parks is in Penal Code 46.035. The restrictions of that section are independent of whether the owner or lessee has posted signs complying with 30.06 or 30.07. So it doesn't matter that the signs don't pass muster under 30.06 and 30.07.