G26ster wrote:Dadtodabone wrote:
According to a DoD study, poorly.
http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED366751
The 80 IQ floor limit put in place during WWII should not have been a matter of social experiment.
350,000 young men, many of whom had already been rejected when they attempted to enlist, were drafted under this program.
Their average AFQT score was 13.9! Few could read at greater than a 6th grade level.
According to a HumRRO study
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/703516.pdf training beyond basic was a nightmare. Depending on the particular task, low AFQT subjects required from two to four times as much training time, from two to six times as much prompting, and from two to five times as many trials to reach criterion as did the median AFQT group. Many wound up in Food Service, Transportation or Supply. But over 40%, unable to acquire even a soft skill set, saw combat in Viet Nam. Only 21% of regular inductees saw combat. And they died in combat at almost 3 times the rate of regular inductees.
Probably the most famous depiction of a "New Standards Man" as they were called, was the character Leonard Lawrence aka Gomer Pyle in the film "Full Metal Jacket".
Unless I missed it, I cannot find their combat performance or combat statistics in either of the two links you provided. The first covers income and divorce rates, and the second covers training issues/difficulties. Can you provide me with the link(s) that cover their performance in combat?
As for Leonard Lawrence and the real (or fake) Gomer Pyle, one was mentally disturbed, and the other was quite adept at getting the job done. Perhaps another fictional character, Forrest Gump, would be a better example.
I was addressing the social aspects of the program, since that was how it was promoted. There is no data on combat performance.
General William Westmoreland one time commander of USMAC-V explicitly stated that the NSM had a negative impact on the Army's performance in Southeast Asia.
Interviews with and opinions from officers both commissioned and non-commissioned placed in command of these soldiers, are that the majority performed poorly but adequately.
The Marine Corp experience seems to be the same. Although there was never a statement that they were bad for The Corp ala Westmoreland, the Marines recognized there were problems. I have read this history
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision ... 0Corps.pdf and I'm glad I've found it again. This the only document I've ever found that addresses combat performance. Chapter 7 page 115.
My cousin Herb was a Project 100,00 draftee. A blood flow problem during his delivery left him with a slow man with a quiet disposition, somewhat like Gump. After his service in Viet Nam, while nowhere near the level of Lawrence, he spent the better part of 20 years in and out of VA and private hospitals working through his experiences.
I was never in combat, I served in Europe, with some NSM and punitive enlistment soldiers in my unit. Since that time and due to my cousin's experience, I've dug around trying to find out the consequences of and rationalizations for both programs as a means of manning a modern military force.
None of the rationalizations make sense to me. The consequences are some human wreckage, increased casualties mental and physical, and I truly believe that if the Russki's had been able to roundup 20,000 sober soldiers all at one time they would have rolled right over us.